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Question: 4. (U) Please fully describe the process by which Albuquerque Operations Office conducted its 2001 Security Survey.

Answer: (U) The 2001 LANL survey was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 470.1, the AL Security Survey Procedural Guide, and DOE G 470. 1-1.

Question: 4.a) (U) Who was appointed the survey team leader?

Answer: (U) The 2001 LANL survey team leader was Gary Wisdom, Security Specialist, Office of Amarillo Site Operations.

Question: 4.b) (U) Please provide copies of the Inspection Plan for LANL for 2000 and 2001. In the event that these plans are different from one another, please describe the reason for each change from the 2000 plan.

Answer: (U) The Master Inspection Plan for the 2000 LANL survey is attached. The Master Inspection Plan for the 2001 LANL survey was to be developed by the survey team leader during the 2001 survey, based on individual inspectors' inspection plans. The topic leads met with the survey team leader the first day of the 2001 LANL survey and provided individual inspection plans to him. The Master Inspection Plan has not been provided to SPSD at this time. However, individual inspection plans for the 2001 LANL survey that were provided to SPSD are attached.

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Question: 4.c) (U) How long did the plan take to complete? How long did it take to complete in each of the past 5 years?

Answer: (U) The Master Inspection Plan for each survey conducted by Albuquerque Operations (AL) is usually completed by the survey team leader within a week after receiving the individual inspection plans. Each inspector develops his/her inspection plan for each subtopic. These plans are provided to the survey team leader, who then compiles the Master Inspection Plan. The length of time to complete the plan has been consistent for the past five years.

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Question: 4.d) (U) Please provide copies of the inspectors' findings for the 2001 survey.

Answer: (U) Copies of the findings are attached.

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Question: 4.e) (U) What ratings did LANL receive on the 2001 survey? For each area of security inspected, please list the rating as well as the findings that led the inspector to grant the rating.

Answer: (U) The ratings for the subtopics/topics inspected during the 2001 LANL survey are attached. The rating rationale for the two subtopics rated less than satisfactory are also attached (findings leading to these ratings are attached).

**MASTER SURVEY PLAN FOR THE
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY**

Facility Code 123

**U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE**

September 11-15, 2000

MASTER SURVEY PLAN

1.0 TITLE OF SURVEY

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque Operations Office (AL), Safeguards and Security Survey of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

2.0 PURPOSE OF SURVEY

The objective of the survey is to assess the effectiveness of the protection systems at LANL and to determine whether the protection measures are in compliance and meet performance objectives of applicable DOE policy.

3.0 SURVEY DATES

Data Call Review: September 4-8, 2000 (AL survey team members review documentation on file at AL)

September 10 (on-site review at LANL)

In-briefing: Monday, September 11, - 8 a.m.

Data Gathering: Monday through Thursday, September 11-14, 2000

Working Close-out: Friday, September 15 - 9 a.m.

Management Close-out: Wednesday, September 27 - 2 p.m.

4.0 LOCATION OF FACILITY

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Technical Area 3

Building 43

Casa Grande Drive

Los Alamos, NM

5.0 SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS

(See attached Inspection/Writing Assignments)

6.0 POINTS OF CONTACT

F. Ward, LAAO

S. Busboom, LANL

7.0 SCOPE OF SURVEY

A special survey of selected subtopical areas will be performed to evaluate the Safeguards and Security Program and assign an overall composite facility rating. The limited scope of the survey was agreed to by HQ/DP, due to the number of inspections and reviews conducted recently at LANL. Areas covered by other reviews and surveys will not be inspected (Personnel Development and Training; Facility Approval and Registration of Activities; Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence; Safeguards and Security Plans; Technical Surveillance Countermeasures; Operations Security; Protected Transmission Systems; Communications Security; Security Education Briefings and Awareness; Control of Visits; Unclassified Visits and Assignments by Foreign Nationals; Personnel Assurance Program; and Personnel Security Assurance Program).

7.1 SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS

None.

8.0 INDIVIDUAL INSPECTOR SURVEY PLANS

Individual inspector survey plans, which meet site-specific requirements, are attached. Performance tests will be developed and are approved by the team leader prior to conduct. Any modifications will be completed no later than Monday, September 11. The individual inspector survey plans supplement this master plan and remain a record of the activities conducted during the survey.

9.0 INSPECTION PROTOCOL

Team members will meet on a daily basis to review the progress of the inspection and to identify any areas of concern or problems that have developed. The facility will be informed of significant items as they develop so they have an opportunity to correct any misinformation that the inspection team may be using in their evaluation.

Significant items will be discussed by the team during the daily meetings. It is recommended that an Area Office representative be present at the daily meetings. In the event of an area which needs immediate resolution, the team leader is available and will take appropriate steps with facility management.

Each morning, the team leader and Area Office representative will meet with the designated facility representative to relate team "concerns" expressed during the daily meeting, thus providing an opportunity to correct any misinformation and/or to take immediate corrective action as appropriate.

A concern may, after further examination of documentation or observation, be validated as a "statement of fact" and the identified deficiency becomes a "finding."

Findings will be written in a clear and concise manner to include the references to DOE orders which are not being fulfilled.

After the team has completed all data gathering and finding validation activities within their

respective topical areas, a final review meeting will be held with the team leader and assistant team leader. During this meeting, the findings will be reviewed and subtopic and topic ratings will be assigned and justified.

The Working Close-out meeting provides a final opportunity for facility personnel to discuss the identified findings and present any additional information which may be of value to the team. (NOTE: if the findings have been properly developed and validated by the inspector, the meeting discussion should not be lengthy.)

Working Close-out meeting attendees include the survey team and facility points-of-contact. The team leader presents the findings (in the form of the "Finding Synopsis") and moderates any questions that facility personnel may have.

Ratings are not discussed at this time.
Proposed corrective actions are not discussed.

The Management Close-out meeting takes the form of a high-level briefing presented to facility management and will include findings and ratings. The overall composite facility rating is also identified. The briefing is developed and conducted by the survey team leader.

10.0 SCHEDULES

Individual inspectors' schedule will be modified NLT Tuesday, September 12, 2000, after team members have had a chance to coordinate with their site POC.

10.2 Schedule for Development of Report

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
09/14/00	Inspectors' findings and report narrative complete
09/29/00	Completed draft report from technical editor
10/13/00	Comments on draft report returned from PAS
11/17/00	Final report distribution (target date)

Los Alamos National S&S Survey

September 11 – 15

Physical Security Inspection Plan

B. PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS (PPO)

B.1 Physical Security

The purpose of this portion of the survey is to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the LANL physical protection provided to Special Nuclear Material (SNM), Vital Equipment, Sensitive Information, Classified Matter Departmental Property and unclassified facilities.

The following subtopics will be reviewed:

- **Protective Lighting**
To verify protective illumination at pedestrian and vehicular entrances to permit examination of credentials, vehicles and unauthorized persons. Verify minimum light measures around Protective force posts.
- **Physical Barriers**
To verify perimeter barriers are clearly defined and that fences, walls, and doors are utilized to control, impede, or deny access as designed. Verify that MAAs have separately defined physical barriers, sufficient to direct the flow of personnel and vehicles through designated portals and permit effective searches by providing reasonable assurance that prohibited articles are not introduced and SNM is not transported outside of the MAA without detection.
- **Lock and Key Control**
To verify that only approved locks are used and that a system is used to account for and positively control keys and combinations. Verify the two-man rule is maintained for SNM structures/areas and what type of training the locksmiths receive.

- **Personnel and Vehicle Access Control**

Verify that entrance and exit inspections/searches of personnel, hand-carried items and vehicles provide reasonable assurance that explosive, weapons, and other prohibited articles are not introduced without authorization. Verify that exit inspections/searches are accomplished to prevent the unauthorized removal of SNM at any PA that contains Category II or greater quantities of SNM not within an MAA.

- **Property Protection**

Verify that government property is being protected against damage or destruction arising from deliberate acts of arson, civil disorder, riot, sabotage, terrorism, vandalism, or theft in a manner consistent with its value and the impact of its loss. All required signs, i.e, trespass, prohibited articles, hand-carried items, etc. will be reviewed in this area.

References:

- DOE Order 5632.1C (Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests)
- DOE Manual 5632.1C-1
- DOE Draft Order 473.1 (Physical Protection Program)
- DOE M 473.2-2 (Protective Force Program Manual)
- Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms
- LANL SSSP
- LANL Lock and Key Procedures
- LANL Protective Force Special and General Orders
- LANL Property control and removal Procedures
- LANL Access Control Procedures
- LANL Local Performance Testing Plans and Procedures
- LANL Identification of Security Areas and S&S Interests documents
- U.S. DOE, AL, Security Survey Procedural Guide for Physical Security Programs
- DOE G 470.1-2 (Safeguards and Security Survey and Self-Assessment Guide)

SURVEY CONDUCT

Evaluation of the planning, implementation, and management of the Physical Security Program will include a review of the development and implementation of planning documents, management support/involvement, administration of the program, staffing qualifications to implement the protection programs, reporting, and other activities associated with the Physical Security Program.

INTERVIEWS

- Security staff and Management assigned responsibility for developing and implementing the Physical Security Program
- Receptionist/employee controlling access to facility
- Access control personnel
- Personnel assigned to monitor portals
- Personnel performing inspections of vehicles and hand-carried items
- Personnel responsible for key control
- Locksmiths
- Property Management

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The goal of the physical security survey is to ensure that protective measures and subsystems perform as intended and designed.

Performance test in this area will be taken from the Albuquerque Operations Office Performance Testing Procedural Guide, dated May 1997 and approved by the PPO topical team leader.

Performance tests may be conducted on an announced or unannounced basis. Unannounced performance tests will be coordinated with a "trusted agent" assigned by senior facility management to minimize operation impacts. Additionally, the "trusted agent" will assist in reviewing safety aspects of the performance tests and ensuring they are followed.

**INSPECTION PLAN
FOR
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORIES
SECURITY SYSTEMS PROGRAM**

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this portion of the subject inspection is to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the security systems protection provided to special nuclear material (SNM) classified matter and government property. All aspects of the LANL security systems operations will be addressed. This inspection is compliance and performance oriented. The inspection team is to make extensive use of performance testing in determining the adequacy of the security systems protection program. This will include testing of detectors and X-ray equipment, the intrusion detection system (IDS), as well as tests to ensure compliance with procedures including maintenance and quality assurance. Limited scope performance tests (LSPTs) will be used to assess the effectiveness of the protective force. DOE safeguards and Security (S&S) Orders and Standards and Criteria will be considered.

The purpose of this plan is to detail the areas to be reviewed during the inspection of this subtopical area.

Inspection Team members will utilize the references including, but not limited to, those identified below.

II. REFERENCES

- 1) DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program
- 2) DOE Order 5632.1C
- 3) Safeguards and Security Survey Reports
- 4) 1999 OA Inspection Report
- 5) LANL Site Safeguards Security Plan (SSSP)
- 6) LANL Standard Operating Procedures

III. INSPECTION CONDUCT

Security Systems

This inspection activity involves assessing the scope and effectiveness of the LANL security systems. This will be accomplished through inspection of the systems, interviews with appropriate individuals, and the conduct of LSPTs. The inspectors will ensure the security systems and access controls at the site perimeter and areas of security interest are well defined and that there is strict conformance to established procedures.

Protection of SNM and Classified Matter

Category 1 quantities of SNM in Use and in Storage and the Central and Secondary Alarm stations.

Access and Search Controls

- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
- X-ray Systems
- Explosive Detection Systems
- SNM Detection Systems (portal/hand-held)
- Metal Detection Systems (portal/hand-held)
- Procedures

Intrusion Detection and Assessment

- Central Alarm Station
- Secondary Alarm Station
- Annunciation
- Sensitivity
- False Alarm Rate
- Exterior Sensors
- Interior Sensors
- Emergency Power Supply
- Assessment and Response
- Procedures

Testing and Maintenance

- Equipment
- Procedures

LANL Periodic Safeguards and Security Survey
September 11-15, 2000
Inspection Plan - PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

This topical area deals with the protection of safeguards and security interests at the facility, including the physical security measures and security systems employed to protect those interests, the effective use of protective force (PF) and security for SNM and classified matter in transit.

The purpose of Protection Program Operations is to protect DOE's safeguards and security interests from malevolent acts that may occur. Malevolent acts may include: theft, diversion, industrial sabotage, radiological sabotage, destruction, riots, terrorism, espionage, unauthorized access, loss or compromise, or other hostile acts which may cause adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of employees and the public. The "Design Basis Threat Policy for the Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" (U), dated September 7, 1994, and vulnerability assessments will be used in conjunction with local threat guidance for the development and implementation of the Protection Program Operations program.

The Protection Program Operations program should include a strategy for protecting each safeguards and security interest.

- Protection strategies include the denial, containment, recapture/recovery and pursuit.
- Denial and containment strategies rely upon physical security, security systems, and PF personnel.
- The type of strategy used will be determined by the impact that a malevolent act would have on national security, the health and safety of DOE and DOE contractor employees, the environment, the public, or loss or damage of Government property.
- A denial strategy will be used for the protection of any safeguards and security interest (e.g., Category IA SNM, certain radiological sabotage targets, etc.) where unauthorized access presents an unacceptable risk.

Survey Content

Evaluation of the implementation and management of the Protection Program Operations includes a review of management support/involvement, administration of the program elements, funding and staffing to implement the protection programs, planning (safeguards and security as well as safety), reporting, and other activities associated with the Protection Program Operations program.

Documentation

The SSSP and local operating procedures will be reviewed. Additionally, there will be contingency/emergency plans and plans for the support by outside federal and local law enforcement agencies. From these documents, the survey team will become familiar with the site layout, site mission, and identify potential targets as part of the survey planning process. Additional documentation may be requested while conducting the on-site survey activities.

II. PROTECTIVE FORCE

The PF protects DOE safeguards and security interests from theft, diversion, industrial sabotage, radiological sabotage, toxicological sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, loss or compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the environment, or the health and safety of employees and the public.

Protective personnel who are armed protect life and property at DOE facilities as authorized by 10 CFR 1047.

To fulfill this mission, the PF must have proper management and supervision, a comprehensive, well-documented formal training program, and sufficient quantities of appropriate, well-maintained, and properly deployed equipment and facilities. Protective personnel must possess both routine and tactical skills to enable them to perform their mission as individuals or as a team.

References

- 10 CFR 1046, Physical Protection of Security Interests
- 10 CFR 1047, Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by PF Officers
- DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program
- DOE Order 5632.1C, Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests
- DOE M 5621.1C, Manual for Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests
- DOE Order 5632.7A, Protective Force Program
- DOE M 473.2-1, Firearms Qualification Course Manual
-

Survey Content

Evaluation of the planning, implementation, and management of the PF will include development and implementation of planning documents, management support/involvement, administration of the program, reporting, and other activities associated with the PF program. The main areas to be reviewed are the proper management and supervision, a comprehensive, well-documented formal training program, and sufficient quantities of appropriate, well-maintained, and logically deployed equipment and facilities.

The process of evaluation includes assessing the results of the survey activities (document reviews, interviews, and performance testing). Key elements of the evaluation are:

- Integration
 - Site protection measures with the site security plans
 - Site protection measures with its value and the impact of its loss
- Analyzing data
- Developing findings, suggestions, and observations
- Recognizing noteworthy accomplishments/achievements
- Validation of observations
- Compiling field activity notes
- System performance tests.

Documentation

DOE orders require that all PF policies and procedures be properly documented. Document review will include the following documents:

- PF general and post orders
- PF shift schedules and post assignments
- PF weapons and ammunition inventories
- Vehicle maintenance records
- Weapons maintenance logs
- Response Plans
- Recapture/Recovery Plans
- Explosive Detection Plans
- Memoranda of Understanding with local law enforcement agencies and documentation of exercises conducted with those agencies
- Protective Force Training Plan
- PF training records which include:
 - Basic/Initial training
 - Refresher training
 - Re-qualification training
 - Special training
 - Remedial training

- In-service training
- On-the-job training (OJT)
- A list of PF personnel who are subject to weapons qualification within 90 days of the start date of the survey
- A list of PF personnel who are medically certified to participate in the physical fitness program
- All documentation of PF exercises conducted since the last DOE Safeguards and Security Survey
- Job task analyses (JTA)

Documents will be thoroughly reviewed to:

- Ensure compliance with DOE directives
- Identify inconsistencies and contradictions
- Ensure understanding of, and familiarity with, the PF
- Develop ideas for system performance testing
- Identify deviations to DOE directives

Interviews

Meetings will be scheduled and interviews conducted with the following:

- PF management
- PF supervisors
- PF training staff
- Special Response Team (SRT) leaders
- Security police officers (SPOs) and security officers (SOs)
- Facility safeguards and security management (concerning interface with PF)
- PF safety managers

Virtually any member of the PF, from the manager to a recruit undergoing basic training, is a potential interview candidate. Facility employees who are not members of the PF may be interviewed to provide information about PF practices they observe. While interviews can be used to round out the survey team's knowledge of the PF, their more important function is to help determine the knowledge and perceptions of individuals. Members of the PF may be interviewed on or off post to determine their perception, understanding, and knowledge of policies, procedures, requirements, and duties.

The processes of evaluation include assessing the results of the above activities (document reviews, interviews, and performance testing). Key elements of the evaluation are:

- Coordination
 - PF elements (SPO, SRT, etc.)
 - PF and Local Law Enforcement Agencies

- PF and FBI
- Integration
 - Basic training with site-specific job task
 - SRT training with tasks associated with SRT duties
- Analyzing data
- Developing findings, suggestions, observations
- Recognize noteworthy accomplishments/achievements
- Validation of observations
- Compiling field activity notes
- Implementation of written procedures
- Adequacy of protective equipment and vehicles

Performance Measures

Performance testing of a PF involves a wide range of activities from the very simple to the very complex. Performance tests are used to realistically evaluate, and verify the effectiveness of PF programs; identify and provide training for personnel; identify areas requiring system improvements; validate implemented improvements; and motivate PF personnel. Such tests are to adhere to the policy and requirements found in Reference 56 (Attachment 1). All major functions of the PF are to be tested.

PF performance tests are divided into six types: 1) Limited Scope Performance Tests (LSPTs), 2) Alarm Response and Assessment Performance tests, 3) Force-On-Force (FOF) exercises, 4) Command Post Exercises, 5) Command Field Exercises, and 6) Joint Training Exercises. At a minimum, LSPTs will be conducted to test the following elements of the PF system and organization:

- Firearms qualification proficiency
- Physical fitness proficiency
- Response to alarms and other security situations
- Command and control capabilities
- Special Response Team (SRT) tactics and capabilities
- SPO knowledge and proficiency with issued equipment (handcuffs, OC spray, gas masks, etc.)
- SPO or SO personnel knowledge of DOE use of force criteria, approved facility general orders, post orders and procedures
- Operation and reliability of assigned equipment and vehicles

Other exercises may be performed as appropriate for the facility. All performance tests must be planned, coordinated, documented and executed as specified in the AL SPSPD Performance Testing Procedural Guide.

Performance tests, of whatever type, generally lend themselves to being conducted on either an announced or unannounced basis. Unannounced performance tests require special planning

and coordination to ensure safety and minimum disruption of facility operation. For this reason, a knowledgeable "trusted agent" should be provided by senior facility management to the survey team.

Major aspects of the coordination, planning, conduct and results of PF performance test will be documented in the survey report.

A written test plan will be prepared for PF performance testing activities. The plan will consider and include, as appropriate:

- a. The specific element of the PF being tested;
- b. The objective of the test;
- c. Applicable pass/fail criteria;
- d. Specific safety considerations;
- e. Specific safeguards and security considerations;
- f. Test results documentation and after action reviews; and
- g. Classification of the proposed test and anticipated results, as appropriate.

PF performance tests will be conducted with the highest regard for the safety and health of personnel, protection of the environment, and protection of government property. Specific safety considerations and requirements for conducting PF performance tests are found in Reference S6 (Attachment 1). Specific performance tests are found in Attachment 2.

Performance testing will be conducted as outlined below:

- Limited Scope Performance Test -- AS REQUIRED
- Alarm Response and Assessment -- 2/YEAR/ALARMED LOCATION
- Force-On-Force Exercise -- 1/YEAR/FACILITY
- Command Post Exercise -- 1/YEAR/SITE
- Command Field Exercise -- 1/YEAR/SITE
- Joint Training Exercise -- AS REQUIRED

Annual requirements for Force-On-Force exercise, Command Post exercise, and Command Field exercise may be combined where determined appropriate in Site Safeguards and Security Plans. Requirements for Alarm Response and Assessment Performance Tests may also be satisfied through combined testing of multiple alarms in the same or proximate location(s).

Los Alamos National Lab S&S Survey

September 11-15

Security Badges, Credentials, and Shields Inspection Plan

B. PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS (PPO)

B.4 Security Badges, Credentials, and Shields

The purpose of this portion of the survey is to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the LANL security badge, credential, and shield program. The survey will verify this program provides a means for ensuring that only authorized personnel enter, occupy, or leave a security area and indicate limitations placed on access to SNM and classified matter.

References:

- DOE Order 5632.1C (Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests)
- DOE M 5632.1C-1 (Manual for Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests)
- Draft DOE Order 473.1 (Physical Protection Program)
- LANL SSSP
- LANL Access Control Procedures
- U.S. DOE, AL Security Survey Procedural Guide for Physical Security Programs
- DOE G 470.1-2 (Safeguards and Security Survey and Self-Assessment Guide)

SURVEY CONDUCT

Evaluation of the planning, implementation, and management of the Security Badges, Credentials and Shields Program will include a review of the development and implementation of planning documents, management support/involvement, administration of the program, staffing qualifications to implement the program reporting, and other activities associated with the Security Badges, Credentials and Shields Program.

The main elements to be reviewed are:

- Badge/Credential/Shield handling
- • Storage/physical protection
- Transmitting procedures
- • Destruction - *REVIEW* ✓
- Practices of badging system
- Procedures for forgotten badges *5 DAYS 24 HR HRP T*
- Recovery of badges from terminating employees/subcontractors - *CLEARANCE PROCESSING HANDLED*
- Accountability/annual inventories *N/A*
- Records of lost badges/credentials - *100+ IN FILE FILE DESTROYED*
- Notification to personnel controlling security areas of lost badges - *SPECIAL OFFICE*
- Clearance verification prior to badge issue *VADG - KALIN*
- Visitor badging/logs/dates
- • Deviations *N/A*

Review procedures in effect to retrieve badges from employees terminating under unusual circumstances, i.e., death, imprisonment or quitting without notice.

INTERVIEWS

- Security staff and Management assigned responsibility for developing and implementing the Security Badge, Credentials and Shields Program
- Security Police Officers and Security Officers
- CAS/SAS operators and/or other access control personnel
- Protective Force managers

entry-control system(s) will be performance tested by using performance tests taken from the Albuquerque Operations Office Performance Testing Procedural Guide, dated May 1997 and approved by the PPO topical team leader.

Access control systems and visitor control systems should be performance tested as well.

Performance tests may be conducted on an announced or unannounced basis. Unannounced performance tests will be coordinated with a "trusted agent" assigned by senior facility management to minimize operation impacts. Additionally, the "trusted agent" will assist in reviewing safety aspects of the performance tests and ensuring they are followed.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The goal of the Security Badges, Credentials and Shields Program is to ensure that only authorized personnel enter, occupy, or leave a security, and to indicate limitations placed on access to SNM and classified matter.

The tamper-resistance of badge/pass documents and the effectiveness of the entry-control system(s) will be performance tested by using performance tests taken from the Albuquerque Operations Office Performance Testing Procedural Guide, dated May 1997 and approved by the PPO topical team leader.

Access control systems and visitor control systems should be performance tested as well.

Performance tests may be conducted on an announced or unannounced basis. Unannounced performance tests will be coordinated with a "trusted agent" assigned by senior facility management to minimize operation impacts. Additionally, the "trusted agent" will assist in reviewing safety aspects of the performance tests and ensuring they are followed.

Los Alamos National Lab S&S Survey

September 11-15

Transportation Security Inspection Plan

B. PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS (PPO)

B.5 Transportation Security

Based on existing guidance from HQ, common/commercial carriers will be inspected during the overall facility security survey. Shipment surveys provide a basis for evaluating the adequacy of protection afforded DOE classified matter or SNM during over-the-road and intra shipments.

This sub-topic will not include the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) shipping activities. Surveys of SNM, classified matter and/or sensitive information shipping operations (land, sea, and air) are limited to survey of physical and technical protection provided in transit.

Reference:

- DOE M 471.2-1A (Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual)
- DOE Order 470.1 (Safeguards and Security Program)
- LANL SSSP
- Common Carrier approved security plans
- LANL Procedures for intra-site shipments
- U.S. DOE, AL, Security Survey Procedural Guide for Physical Security Programs
- DOE G 470.1-2 (Safeguards and Security Survey and Self Assessment Guide)

SURVEY CONDUCT

Evaluation of the planning, implementation, and management of the transportation of SNM and classified matter will include the review of development and implementation of planning documents, management support/involvement, administration of the program, reporting, and other activities associated with the Transportation Security Program.

The main elements to be reviewed are:

- Handling and transporting procedures
- Packaging
- Seals/tamper-resistant devices
- Combination padlocks
- Assurances/Notification requirements
- Protective Measures
 - Constant surveillance
 - Tracking system
 - Tamper indicating devices & lock checks at stops/layovers
 - Verification of identity of personnel receiving classified matter
- Deviations to DOE directives

INTERVIEWS

- Security staff and Management assigned responsibility for developing and implementing the Transportation Security Program
- DOE's responsible program oversight office
- LANL's designated responders
- EOC personnel responsible for response and recovery
- Warehouse personnel (shipment preparations)
- Security oversight personnel
- Drivers/pilot/and their escorts

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Shipment surveys do not lend themselves to performance testing in the traditional DOE sense. The most effective performance test is to accompany a randomly selected shipment. The shipment should be reviewed from the origination until unloading at destination. Such a performance test will allow us to determine if: 1) appropriate DOE-approved procedures and protective measures are being followed; 2) adequate surveillance of the matter being shipped is maintained, and 3) appropriate emergency procedures are followed.

**SPSD Inspection – Los Alamos National Laboratory
September 11-15, 2000**

Inspection Plan for – B.5 Transportation Security

Team Leader – Rich Lucero, SPSP/SPSSB
Topic Lead – Ronnie Pierce/Lorenzo Carrillo

Ref: DOE O 5632.1C

Shipping Area:

- ✓ The Scanning of packages for inventory purposes (how is classified moved once received?)
- ✓ Classified left overnight (safeguards in effect, Vault etc.)
- ✓ Chain of custody for classified material once received.
- ✓ How long is classified left of shipment floor?

Classified Carriers (Commercial/Government)

- ✓ Commercial Carrier must be an approved carrier per 5634.1B
- ✓ Verify the exclusive use of the commercial carrier
- ✓ Shipments shall be made without intermediate stops except for emergencies
- ✓ Training Procedures (annual)
- ✓ Prohibited articles
- ✓ GSA approved combination locks shall be used to secure closed cargo area of vehicle
- ✓ Detailed inspection of vehicle prior to loading
- ✓ Cargo compartments locked and sealed. TID's should be employed to indicate evidence of tampering
- ✓ Photo identification required
- ✓ Proof of clearance and level
- ✓ Contents securely packaged
- ✓ Seals should be numbered and entered on the bill of lading or shipping paper
- ✓ Verify TID's or seals upon arrival of shipment
- ✓ Carrier shall provide immediate notice to shipper of any serious delay en-route
- ✓ Shipper should have in place a means of tracing shipment
- ✓ Notification of shipment shall be transmitted prior to departure to the consignee
 - ✓ Should include nature of shipment
 - ✓ Means of transportation
 - ✓ Seal numbers
 - ✓ Estimate time of arrival
 - ✓ Request notification if shipment not received by a specific time

2000 LANL Safeguards & Security Survey [9/10 - 15]

Inspection Plan - Classified Matter Protection & Control (CMPC)

Prepared By: Clarence Marquez, DOE-AL CMPC Operations Manager

Date: September 8, 2000

Thru: Richard Keck, Info. Sec. Topic Team Leader

For: Richard Lucero, Survey Team Leader

I. INTRODUCTION

This sub-topical area deals with the protection of classified matter and sensitive unclassified information, in whatever form, from potential loss, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure.

II. CLASSIFIED MATTER PROTECTION AND CONTROL

Description

The Classified Matter Protection and Control (CMPC) Program should encompass a system of procedures, facilities, and equipment to protect and control classified matter and material that is being generated, received, transmitted, used, stored, reproduced, or destroyed. These processes are developed for consistent implementation to ensure that classified information is protected from inadvertent release to unauthorized individuals.

References

- DOE Order 470.1 (Safeguards & Security Program), dated 9/28/95 *[has been extended to September 29, 2000]*
- DOE Order 471.2A (Information Security Program), dated 3/27/97 *[has been extended to September 26, 2000]*
- DOE Manual 471.2-1B (Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual), dated 1/6/99

Survey Content

The 2000 CMPC review of LANL will be greatly reduced in scope. DOE management has directed that the team focus the scope on the review of "specific programs" at the site. These programs number approximately nineteen in size and contain a variety of classified matter with various protection requirements. CMPC requirements will be addressed only towards these programs and the laboratory as a whole will not be inspected.

Relative to these "specific programs," the CMPC review will include the evaluation of the implementation and management of the CMPC Program, to include administration, procedures, training, dissemination and transmission, reproduction, and destruction. Other key program elements to be reviewed relative to these "specific programs" are: CMPC procedures, control stations, and special protection/accountability, control measures by custodians and authorized users and potential special programmatic requirements. Additionally, the new *Enhanced Security Measures*, which were effective June 26, 2000, will be applied against the "specific programs."

Documentation [The following criteria is applicable only to the "specific nineteen special programs, which will be reviewed].

- **CMPC Procedures.** Review the procedures to understand how these "specific programs" are implemented. DOE O 471.2A [Information Security Program, and DOE CMPC Manual 471.2-1B].
- **Control Station Procedures.** In most cases there will be a separate "procedures document" separate from the overall CMPC procedures handbook, which specifically talks to "*Document Custodian responsibilities at a Classified Document Control Station.*" This should be reviewed to understand how classified matter is received or distributed at the facility. Conduct an interview with the "designated" Document Custodian(s). Request a copy of the appointment letter, which designates the individual as the Document Custodian.
- **Control Station Training.** DOE M 471.2-1B, CMPC Manual, Chapter II, Paragraph 4.b. requires employees of control stations to be trained. Reviewing training material will ensure compliance with this requirement.
- **Safeguards and Security Site Plan (SSSP).** The SSSP or other security plans should be reviewed to ensure that the CMPC function has been incorporated in the protection program planning documents. (Obtain Chapter & Pg. Number where located _____) with the document.

Interviews / And Documentation Review

- CMPC Program Manager at the assigned facility: This individual will be one of the first individuals contacted at the beginning of the survey. This individual manages and is knowledgeable of the CMPC Program at the facility. This individual will provide an understanding of what the CMPC Program consists of and what guidelines are being followed. The contractor at a site is required to have an individual assigned the role of implementation and oversight of the program. This individual will be interviewed in this case.
- Classified Document Custodians (CDS's) at Document Control Stations: Individuals who operate the control station(s), which maintains records and controls the incoming and out going of classified matter at the facility will be another interview. This will provide information on how classified matter moves into and out of the facility, which is key to the effectiveness of the program.
- Custodians or Authorized Users: Individuals who possess classified matter will be interviewed to establish their knowledge and implementation of protecting and controlling classified matter. Ascertain what employees generally work with classified information on a routine basis. At random, select an adequate sampling and conduct interviews.
- Reproduction Staff: In most large M&O facilities, there is a Centralized classified reproduction location where classified is reproduced in large quantities. Interviews should be conducted to ascertain procedures and knowledge of the staff and how classified matter is protected. Determine how classified matter for these "special programs" are being reproduced.

Reference Material:

- DOE O 471.2A, Chapter IV, 1., states that the objective of the CMPC Program is to establish, among other things, a system of procedures to protect and control classified matter that is being generated, received, transmitted, used, stored, reproduced or destroyed.
- DOE O 471.2A, Chapter 1.a., states that a clear chain of responsibility for information security shall exist within each organization. [Is there evidence of a clear chain of responsibility defined for Custodians, Alternates, and staff members to ensure and effective CMPC program]

- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter II, 4.b. Control stations shall be established and used to maintain records, access lists (when required), and control classified matter (including facsimiles) received by and/or dispatched from facilities. Employees must be designated and trained to operate these control station(s), and the employees shall have access authorizations commensurate with the level of their classified control responsibilities.
- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter III, 2.b. Any person who discovers classified matter out of proper control shall take custody of such matter and safeguard it in an appropriate manner, and shall immediately notify the facility security officer. Are FSO's being notified??
- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter I, 5. Personnel whose responsibilities include the generation, handling/use, storage, reproduction, transmission, and/or destruction of classified matter shall receive appropriate training to ensure such matter is not lost or compromised.
- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter II, 3.a.(2). Markings: The following elements that are common to all classified documents include classification level, classification category (if RD or FRD), caveats (special markings), classifier information, originator identification, classification of titles, unique identification numbers (accountable only), and portion marking. Conduct a random sampling of from various classified holdings to ascertain proper markings or lack thereof.
- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter II, 3.q.(1)-(5) Working Papers and Drafts. Classified working papers and drafts are considered to be interim production stages toward the generation of a permanent document. Working Papers should contain:
 - (1) Date created
 - (2) The highest potential overall classification level of the draft top & bottom (cover pg., title pg. First pg., and back of last pg.)
 - (3) The overall category (if RD or FRD) of the draft - top & bottom (cover, title, first pages and back of last pg.)
 - (4) The annotation "WORKING PAPERS" or "DRAFT" (cover, title and first pages)
 - (5) Any applicable caveats or special markings should be annotated (cover, title and first pages)
 - (6) Markings prescribed for a finished document shall be applied when:
 - (a) released by the originator outside the activity or office,
 - (b) retained for more than 180 days from date of origin, or
 - (c) filed permanently.

Note: A working paper or draft may exceed 180 days in "draft form" only if a log is attached to the working paper reflecting the date the change/revision has occurred. The revisions to the working paper must be evident.

- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter II, 5.b. Equipment. Classified documents shall be reproduced on equipment specifically approved and designated for such purpose to ensure minimal risk of unauthorized disclosure. Ensure that a formal approval process has been developed to ensure only those reproduction machines, which do not pose a risk of unauthorized disclosure, are used to reproduce classified matter.

1. With the advent of technology, a more sophisticated copier/reproduction machine containing *[remote diagnostics, hard drives that can store a vast quantity of information and computer laden technologies]* are replacing the old analog copier/printers. This technology has also brought with it a "new threat" whereby adversaries can tap or dial "in-to" this technology via remote diagnostics or can surreptitiously confiscate the hard drive.

[Ensure that there is a comprehensive "process" from the time a request is made for a new copier/reproduction machine, to the time that Purchasing processes the request, to the time the Vendor delivers the new machine, to the time new machine requires maintenance, to the time the machine is placed in storage]: This comprehensive process of review should include:

- (a) the requesting organization and identification of where the copier will be located and whether it will be used for reproduction of classified matter
 - (b) If the copier is going to be used for classified reproduction, Purchasing should have a list of copiers provided by the Vendor that will meet the needs of the organization while mitigating the threat (disabling remote diagnostics, having Q-cleared individuals escorting maintenance staff who are not Q-cleared, etc.
 - (c) the Purchasing department should verify the documentation to the delivery
 - (d) Purchasing should coordinate with appropriate staff from Computer Security, TSCM, TEMPEST and Personnel Security to ensure all threats have been addressed
 - (e) The new copier/reproduction machine can now be placed into service
- DOE M 471.2-1B, Chapter II, 8.c. Equipment. Classified matter shall be destroyed by equipment that has been approved by the cognizant security office. [In small facilities the FSO would have this responsibility]
 - DOE M 5632.1C-1, Chapter IX, 2.e.(2) Changing Combinations. Combinations shall be changed at the earliest practical time following: Reassignment, transfer, or termination of employment of any person having knowledge of the combination, or when the Departmental access authorization granted to any such person is downgraded to a level lower than the category of matter stored, or when the Departmental access authorization has been administratively terminated, suspended, or revoked.

Performance Measures

The following areas will be considered for performance testing during the survey of the CMPC subtopic:

- Document Generation
- Document Marking
- Document Reproduction
- Document and Material Control System(s)
- Document and Material Storage
- Document Accountability Front Check
- Document Accountability Back Check
- Document Receipt
- Document and Material Transmittal
- Document and Material Destruction

The information below may be incorporated under interviews or as performance tests.

The survey team will interview selected personnel specifically responsible for administering document generation. They will also interview other staff and tour workspaces to determine whether site-specific policies are understood and effectively implemented. The survey team will determine whether the individuals understand local document preparation procedures and their responsibilities. If specific local procedures have not been published, individuals will be asked to explain all aspects of how they prepare documents. The survey team will also check for availability of necessary procedures, references, and cover sheets. The survey team may ask the custodian or responsible individual to demonstrate the procedures.

To supplement information provided by custodians or authorized users, the survey team will interview selected individuals who only occasionally generate, write, or prepare classified documents to determine how well they understand their responsibilities. Noting the authors of classified memoranda or reports and identifying individuals with security clearances who work outside a limited area can identify such persons. Survey teams will determine exactly how the procedures are applied, and compare the results with DOE and site policies. If local procedures do not exist, the survey team will ask the responsible individuals to explain all aspects of how they prepare documents and interact with other individuals involved. The survey team may also elect to ask individuals whether they are currently writing or working on any classified documents to see how they are marked.

The survey team will interview selected specialists and administrative personnel who routinely or occasionally use special or unique equipment, e.g., viewgraph machines to generate classified documents in order to determine how well they understand their responsibilities. The survey team will determine exactly how the procedures are applied and compare the results with DOE and site policies.

staff members to determine the procedures used for limiting access, enforcing need-to-know, and attending classified documents outside locked repositories. Also, the survey team will determine whether staff members clearly understand the procedures. The procedures should be clearly documented in writing. The survey team will determine whether the procedures are available to all staff members. Up-to-date access lists should be available to custodians to help them determine need-to-know for individuals wanting access to classified documents.

When checking repositories, the survey team will determine who has access. They will check to ensure that individuals who have access also have a need-to-know for all the classified information in the security container.

The survey team will accompany or follow intra-site messengers or post office couriers to determine whether they constantly attend and control the classified matter they pick up and deliver.

With the reduction in accountability, the survey team will interview administrative personnel and supervisors to determine what checkout procedures are used. They will determine whether these individuals fully understand the procedures and to what extent the procedures are actually followed. The name of employees who have transferred, terminated, or died recently will be obtained to see whether their documents have been transferred, their names removed from access lists, and appropriate combinations changed.

Special Note: Writing FINDINGS against a Facility:

Although it is SPSD/ICSD policy not to write Findings against the Facility being inspected if previously identified in a Self-Assessment, a Finding will be written if:

- It is disclosed that milestones are not being met regarding the "Corrective Action Plan"; or,
- If the finding identified during the Survey has major implications to the overall protection program system effectiveness for the facility and would significantly affect the "Rating" for a sub-topic, a topic, or the overall Composite Rating for the facility.

Authored By: Clarence Marquez, CMPC Team Lead,

9/8/00

The survey team will interview selected document holders, supervisors, secretaries, and other staff members to determine the procedures used for limiting access, enforcing need-to-know, and attending classified documents outside locked repositories. Also, the survey team will determine whether staff members clearly understand the procedures. The procedures should be clearly documented in writing. The survey team will determine whether the procedures are available to all staff members. Up-to-date access lists should be available to custodians to help them determine need-to-know for individuals wanting access to classified documents.

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